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I. Introduction
In an agenda setting essay first published in 2002, Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons argued that the study of international organizations (IOs) and institutions (IIs) had reached an important threshold, focusing less on why they exist and more on "whether and how they significantly impact governmental behavior and international outcomes" (Martin and Simmons 2002, 192) . Put differently, the past decade has seen a sustained move by students of international institutions and organizations to viewing their subject matter as independent variables affecting state interests and policy. Conceptually, this has put a premium on identifying the mechanisms connecting institutions to states; methodologically, there has been a growing concern with measuring process.
In this paper, I assess several studies that make claims about international institutions influencing state-level action through various processes and mechanisms. The move to process and to the method of process tracing has been salutary, I argue, producing rich and analytically rigorous studies that demonstrate the multiple roles -good and badinstitutions play in global politics.
At the same time, challenges remain. In terms of design, scholars often fail to address the problem of equifinality -where multiple causal pathways may lead to the same outcomeand instead conduct process tracing only on their preferred argument. Theoretically, the power and generalizability of arguments about institutions seem to decrease as the focus shifts to process. Finally, the potential for process tracing to help scholars produce integrative frameworks about international institutions -combining insights from different social-theoretic toolkits -remains unfulfilled.
Work on IOs and IIs thus addresses a number of the criteria for good process tracing outlined in recent methodological discussions (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2014 , chapter 1). The more general standards (alternative explanations, possible biases in evidentiary sources) are often explicitly invoked. However, those specifically relevant for process tracing -most important, addressing equifinality; and the a priori specification of observable implications -are too often left unaddressed. For sure, discussing the latter will clutter the empirical narrative and story, but the trade-off will be more robust explanations. Thus, an important challenge for future work is to be more explicit, both in the operationalization of process tracing and the evaluative standards behind its use.
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows. I begin with a brief review of work on international institutions and organizations, focusing largely on research conducted by political scientists and IR theorists; this provides context for the current focus on mechanisms and process. 1 I then discuss four works that are empirical examinations of the processes and mechanisms through which II/IOs shape behavior and interests; two are rationalist in orientation (Wallander 1999; Schimmelfennig 2003) , while two are broadly constructivist (Kelley 2004a; Autesserre 2010) . My purpose is not to recount the stories they tell, but to provide a net assessment of their turn to mechanisms and use of process tracing. In a third, concluding section, I argue that students of IOs need to remember that method is no substitute for theory, and that they can strengthen their arguments by combining process tracing with other techniques, such as agent-based modeling.
II. The Study of International Institutions
By the mid-to late 1990s, IR research on institutions and IOs had reached a new level of sophistication.
Some rationalists built upon Keohane's neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984; see also Mitchell 1994; Simmons 1994 ), but applied it to new issue areas (security -Wallander 1999) or new -domestic -levels of analysis (Martin 2000) . A different set of rational choice scholars advanced a principal-agent perspective to think more specifically about the relation between states and IOs (Pollack 2003; Hawkins, et al 2006) . From a more sociological perspective, constructivists began to document a different, social role for IIs and IOs, where they created meaning and senses of community that subsequently shaped state interests (Finnemore 1996; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 2004) . Among all scholars, the focus was shifting away from asking why such institutions existed to a logical follow-on question: Given their existence, how and in what ways did they influence politics within and between states (Martin and Simmons 1998)?
Finnemore's 1996 study exemplifies these achievements and shift in emphasis. In its first pages, she argues that political science has focused too much "attention on the problem of how states pursue their interests," rather than "figur [ing] out what those interests are (Finnemore 1996, ix) . She then goes on to develop an argument on IIs and IOs as the source for those state interests. And it is an argument not simply couched in terms of independent (an IO, in this case) and dependent variables (state policy and interests).
Rather, Finnemore is concerned with the intervening process that connects the two.
Analytically, she was thus capturing the workings of what we now call causal mechanisms, or "the pathway or process by which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished" (Gerring 2007, 178) . In her study of state adoption of science policy bureaucracies, UNESCO is not simply some black hole magically diffusing policy; instead, Finnemore theorizes and empirically documents the teaching process behind such diffusion (Finnemore 1996, ch.2) .
At the same time, this turn to process and state properties raised new challenges. In particular, studying IO influence on states means that, to some extent, one must examine their domestic politics, which arguably requires some theory of the latter. However, at this point (mid-1990s), IR scholars were devoting relatively little attention to politics at the state level (Schultz 2013, 478) . Extending these arguments about international institutions to include the domestic level, I argue below, raises additional challenges for those employing process tracing -especially in the absence of any explicit theory of domestic politics.
Another feature of this work was to accord primacy to international-level factors. At first glance, this makes sense; after all, these were IR scholars studying the causal effects of IIs and IOs. Consider the case of international human rights. The assumption was the real action was at the international level, with international human rights norms diffusing to the domestic arena to bring about change (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Thomas 2001 ).
More recently, however, some students of IIs and human rights have reversed the causal arrows, arguing for the primacy of domestic factors (Simmons 2009) . At this domestic level and mirroring the thrust of system-level analyses, the emphasis was again on mechanisms and processes (Simmons 2009, chs.6-7) .
In sum, by the early years of the new millennium, arguments about international institutions were becoming more determinate and fine grained. They were also becoming more empirical, with richly detailed case studies and new data sets replacing the illustrative empirics of earlier work (Keohane 1984) . The language might vary -middlerange approach, intervening variables, process, causal mechanisms -but the goal was the same: to theorize and empirically document the pathways through which IIs and IOs influenced states and state-level processes. More and more scholars, it would seem, were joining the process and mechanism bandwagon.
III. The Process and Mechanism Turn
Perhaps the strongest evidence of a clear move among students of IIs and IOs to study process and mechanisms is a non-event: IR scholars currently have no grand theories in this area. Among rational-choice scholars, Keohane's neo-liberal institutionalism serves at best as a starting point for contemporary analyses (Simmons 2009 , for example); and there certainly is no single, widely accepted constructivist theory of international institutions.
Instead, we have a growing collection of partial, mid-range theories, which are largely the result of the analytic and methodological choice in favor of process and mechanisms.
My analysis in this section is structured around the four books noted earlier, taken in chronological order so as better to assess progress over time in process-based studies of institutions and IOs. They cover different issues areas (security, IO membership expansion, human rights, post-conflict intervention), different parts of the world (Eurasia, Europe, Africa), and a variety of IOs (NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe, UN system). While they likely
are not a representative sample -there are many other books, articles and chapters produced in recent years that study institutions and IOs from a process perspective -they nicely capture the changes at work over time.
For each of the four books, I begin with a summary of its subject matter and core argument. However, the bulk of the analysis is a net assessment of a given author`s turn to mechanisms and process. What was gained? And, equally important, what new challenges arose?
International Institutions and the Great Powers
Celeste Wallander's 1999 book is quite explicit in its debt to Keohane's neo-liberal institutionalism (Wallander 1999, ch.2) . However, she moved beyond it in several important ways. First, addressing a criticism lodged against Keohane's early work, she applied his theory to the study of high politics security institutions, in contrast to the low politics / economics emphasis of Keohane's own research (1984) and that of his early followers (Simmons 1994 Wallander thus does not just conduct process tracing on her preferred -institutionalistperspective. Rather, she takes seriously the possibility there may be alternative causal pathways leading to the outcome she seeks to explain -so-called equifinality. This is a central requirement of good process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 28) .
Moreover, the evidence for her institutionalist argument is not presented as a loosely structured narrative. Rather, the book's case-study chapters carefully fit the evidence to the deductive logic of her theory, another criterion of well-executed process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 39) . That is, through her interviews, readers see how Russian and German security officials are relying on key regional organizations to structure their relations and interests. For sure, there is still an inferential gap here, as Wallander presents little "smoking gun" evidence establishing a direct institution-interest tie (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 20-21 ). Yet, her careful theorization and attention to process has decisively shrunk that gap, especially when compared to earlier neo-liberal work.
In sum, Wallander's book marks an important advance in the study of international (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 38) . 
International Institutions and Membership Expansion
If Wallander (1999) is suggestive of a greater emphasis on process in the study of international institutions, then Schimmelfennig's study on the post-Cold War enlargement of European institutions is explicit on this score (Schimmelfennig 2003; see also Gheciu 2005; Checkel 2007 ). Indeed, his central theoretical innovation is to theorize -and then empirically document -the role of rhetorical action as "the mechanism" and "causal link"
between rule-ignoring, egoistic individual state preferences and a rule conforming collective outcome: EU and NATO membership being offered to the formerly communist states of East/Central Europe (Schimmelfennig 2003, 6 ).
Schimmelfennig argues that explaining the enlargement of regional organizations is a neglected area of study, and that post-Cold War Europe offers an ideal laboratory to both theorize and document such processes. This is precisely the task he sets for himself in the book, which begins by conceptualizing Europe as a community environment for state action. He then proceeds to specify the constraints under which states act in such an environment and describes how the rhetorical use of arguments can result in rulecompliant behavior (Schimmelfennig 2003, 6 ).
The concept of rhetorical action, or the strategic use of norms and arguments, serves several purposes for Schimmelfennig. First and theoretically, it moves his argument away from structure and decisively to the level of process, where agents strategically deploy arguments. Second and again theoretically, it positions his argument to bridge rationalist and constructivist modes of social action. After all, arguing, at least before Schimmelfennig wrote, was thought to be a core constructivist concept (Risse 2000) . It was part and parcel of following a so-called logic of appropriateness. For Schimmelfennig, however, arguments are strategically deployed by egoistic agents operating under a socalled logic of consequences.
Thus, the book promises a process-based, social-theoretically plural account of the role played by IOs. And it delivers, with Schimmelfennig operationalizing his argument and testing it against rich empirical material. At the time of writing, it was probably the best example of how one theorizes and measures process in the IO/state relation.
The book is especially strong at the level of methods. In particular, Schimmelfennig does not simply assert the central importance of rhetorical action as the causal mechanism linking IOs to outcomes; he directly addresses the challenge of measuring such mechanisms. Much more so than Wallander -and more explicitly -he carefully thinks through the challenges involved in observing mechanisms. Writing several years before George and Bennett (2005) would popularize the term, Schimmelfennig tells his readers how to conduct process tracing or what he calls "looking into the causal process that links independent and dependent variables … in which the researcher explains an event by detailing the sequence of happenings leading up to it" (Schimmelfennig 2003, 13 ; emphasis in original; quoting in part Dessler 1999, 129) .
In conducting the process tracing, Schimmelfennig follows several of the best practices advanced in recent work (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 28-40) . For one, he increases readers' confidence in his findings by explicitly addressing equifinality, theorizing and empirically testing for mechanisms other than rhetorical action that might also explain the outcomes he observes. Thus, in an entire chapter on "Process Hypotheses" (Schimmelfennig 2003, ch.7), Schimmelfennig theorizes four different processes for how the decision to expand NATO and the EU came about. However, the analysis is anything but abstract, for he then moves to specifying the observable implications of each mechanism. That is, he asks 'if this mechanism were at work, then I would expect to see the following in my empirical data' (Schimmelfennig 2003, 160-62; see also Schimmelfennig 2005 ).
In addition and as his invocation of the various mechanisms suggests, Schimmelfennig casts his net widely for alternative explanations, as counseled by Bennett and Checkel (2014, 28-29) . In so doing, he grounds the discussion specifically in other accounts that seek to explain similar European/EU/NATO outcomes. Finally, throughout the book, Schimmelfennig takes care to present the different theories in detailed, operational form.
This level of detail enhances the reader's confidence in the validity of the inferences he draws from the process tracing.
The result of this theoretical innovation -the turn to and operational use of causal mechanisms -and methodological rigour -the systematic application of process tracing techniques -is a study that significantly advances our knowledge of IOs. For students of European institutions, Schimmelfennig's argument fills the gap left by general and hence highly underspecified theories of integration such as intergovernmentalism or supranationalism. For the more general study of institutions and IOs, Schimmelfennig -by focusing on mechanisms -demonstrates the value added in taking process seriously.
Instead of abstract and general theories that at best hint at how institutions matter, Schimmelfennig's work details the exact causal pathway through which they influence state behavior.
At the same time, the book's overall argument and approach raises a troubling issue, one that would only become more apparent -in the broader II/IO literature -in the years following its publication. A second theoretical limitation is less troubling, but still worth highlighting. Despite
Schimmelfennig's claim to be utilizing insights from rational choice and constructivism (Schimmelfennig 2003, 159, 281-87) , the book essentially offers a clever rational-choice argument where central elements of constructivism -social structure, recursivity, interpretation, holism (Adler 2013 ) -are notable only by their absence. There is some recognition of the importance of theoretical pluralism in the book, but it is quite minimal in the end. To be fair to Schimmelfennig, however, such limited efforts at building theoretical bridges have become the norm (Checkel 2013a) , despite the optimism of its early proponents (Adler 1997; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998; Fearon and Wendt 2002) .
International Organizations and Minority Rights
Like those by Wallander and Schimmelfennig, Judith Kelley's (2004a) With normative pressure -the constructivist mechanism -IOs rely on the use of norms to persuade, shame or praise states into changing their policies (Kelley 2004a, 7-8) .
If Kelley were to stop here, her study would resemble others -specifying the mechanisms between independent (IO) and dependent (state policy) variables. She goes an important step further, however, introducing domestic politics into the analysis, basically as an The argument is tested through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as carefully executed counter-factual analysis. On the qualitative techniques, process tracing is explicitly invoked as playing a key role (Kelley 2004a, 23-24, 67) . While its use is not as systematic as in the case of Schimmelfennig (2003) -Kelley fails to address the challenge of equifinality -she nonetheless provides the reader with a clear and transparent discussion of how it will be applied. For example, she considers potential biases in her empirical material, which is especially important given that interviews are a major data source; combines process tracing with case comparisons to strengthen her inferences; and adapts and operationalizes the general argument about conditionality and socialization to her specific cases, clearly stating the observable implications of each (Kelley 2004a, ch.3; 2004b, 435-37, 449-53) -which are all key criteria of good process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 27-42) .
Overall, then, the book makes an important contribution, both methodologically and theoretically. It illuminates the specific conditions and mechanisms that allow regional organizations to influence policy on highly sensitive issues (policy on ethnic minorities).
For students of IOs, it offers a nuanced understanding of when conditionality is likely to work, which is a welcome contrast to broad-brush critiques asserting that it is rarely if ever effective (Kelley 2004a, 9) . Moreover and in a fashion similar to the other two books discussed, Kelley demonstrates that a focus on process and mechanisms is fully consistent with theoretical and methodological rigor. Finally, with a greater emphasis on policy, she demonstrates how a mechanisms/process approach can and should play a key role in designing policy interventions by the international community (Kelley 2004a, 189-91 2004a, 192-93) .
Second, while Kelley's turn to the domestic level is an important and progressive theoretical move in the study of IOs, it can nonetheless be criticized for being rather simplistic. One gets no theory of domestic politics, be it one emphasizing institutions, interest groups, elites, or the like. Instead, we are told that high levels of domestic opposition make it harder for the international community to influence policy. This is surely no surprise, and does not get beyond, or even up to, the level of earlier theories on two-level games between international and domestic politics (Putnam 1988 ).
Third and similar to Schimmelfennig, Kelley's theoretical bridge building is biased and thus ultimately weak. In particular -and in keeping with Kelley's strong positivist commitments -if she cannot carefully measure and operationalize a concept, it falls by the wayside. Thus, while she claims in the book to be speaking to constructivist social theory, she in fact does this in only a very minimal sense. For example, Kelley invokes the concept of socialization (Kelley 2004a, 7-8, 31, 34-35) , whose sociological core is all about processes of internalization. Yet, she shies from measuring the latter and instead searches for (weak)
proxies as observable implications of it.
While this is a trade off the author explicitly acknowledges (Kelley 2004b, 428-29) , it does limit the argument in important ways. For her, socialization thus boils down to measuring behavioural change; internalization and belief change are absent. Yet the latter matter crucially for the longevity and durability of the domestic policy change to which Kelley gives pride of place.
For someone who argues that a central goal of her research is to promote conversation across theoretical traditions (Kelley 2004a, 9, 187-88) , Kelley therefore comes up short, especially on constructivism. The only constructivism that works for her is that measurable in a way (pre-) determined by her positivist epistemological starting point.
International Institutions and Post-Conflict Interventions
In her recent study, Severine Autesserre uses a focus on mechanism and process to demonstrate that IOs need not always be a force for good, helping states cooperate or promoting global governance (Autesserre 2010 ; see also Autesserre 2009 ). The three other books reviewed here all highlight the role of IOs in fostering interstate cooperation or in promoting normatively good outcomes as intended consequences (enlargement of European institutions; fair treatment of ethnic minorities). There is nothing wrong with such a focus, which has clear roots in Keohane's (1984) original formulation of neo-liberal institutionalism as well as the normative commitment by many of those studying IOs to improve world order.
At the same time, it is entirely plausible -once one grants IOs some degree of autonomy and agency -that they may perform sub-optimally and even pathologically and produce unintended consequences. These latter outcomes need not be caused by member states, but may arise because of processes and mechanisms at work within the organizations themselves (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) .
Picking up on this line of reasoning, Autesserre's book explores the role of international organizations in post-conflict interventions.
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In the post-Cold War era, this has typically meant IO efforts to promote/preserve peace in states were a civil war has occurred. Her specific focus is sub-Saharan Africa and the international community's efforts to intervene in the long-running internal conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These interventions, in Congo and elsewhere, typically do not succeed; in nearly 70% of the cases, they fail to build a durable, post-conflict peace (Autesserre 2010, 5) . Why?
The answer, Autesserre argues, lies not in the national interests of states or specific organizational interests (Autesserre 2009, 272-75; Autesserre 2010, 14-23) , but in a powerful framing mechanism that shapes the understanding and actions of intervening organizations. This peacebuilding culture -as Autesserre calls it -establishes the parameters of acceptable action on the ground by UN peacekeepers; it "shaped the intervention in the Congo in a way that precluded action on local violence, ultimately dooming the international efforts" (Autesserre 2010, 10-11) .
This is an argument about how process -framing dynamics first theorized by sociologists -shape what IOs do and the effects they have. To make it, Autesserre conducts multi-sited ethnography, semi-structured interviews (over 330) and document analysis, spending a total of 18 months in the field -mainly in Congo (Autesserre 2010, 31-37) . While she never explicitly cites process tracing, this is in fact a central technique she employs. In the article-version of the study, Autesserre makes clear her concern is less to capture the relation between independent and dependent variables, and more "to document a dispersed process, where social objects have multiple sources, and where ideas, actions and environmental constraints mutually constitute each other" (Autesserre 2009, 255 , note 21).
Despite its implicit application, the process tracing is carefully executed. For example, while she does not use the language of observable implications, Autesserre does just this throughout the study's empirical chapters, exploring what she ought to see if the dominant frame/peacebuilding-culture is at work (Autesserre 2010, chs.2-5) . In particular, she captures a process whereby a post-conflict frame is first established at the IO-level and then, at later times, affects the attitudes and behaviors of numerous other actors.
Autesserre measures these frame effects by carefully triangulating across multiple data streams. Thus, she examines UN documents, reports findings from field observations andmore ethnographically -engages in participant observation, all with the purpose of documenting both the frame's existence and its effects (Autesserre 2009, 261-63) . This triangulation exercise increases confidence in the validity of Autesserre's inferencesanother of the process-tracing best practices recently advanced (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 35-36) .
It should also be noted that her process-tracing was being conducted in an unstable post- Bringing it all together -the innovative sociological theory, the carefully executed methods, the rich empirics -Autesserre develops a powerful, process-based argument that helps scholars better understand the role (good and bad) that IOs can play in rebuilding war-torn societies. At the same time, this study of IOs, mechanisms and process will leave readers with lingering questions and concerns.
First, does the argument about frames and the failures of peace building travel? Does it explain anything but the -clearly very important -case of Congo? Are there certain scope conditions for the operation of the framing mechanism -that is, when it is likely to affect the behavior of different IOs seeking to intervene in other conflict situations? It would appear not.
As Autesserre makes clear from the beginning (Autesserre 2010, 14-16) , her argument about framing supplements existing explanations based on material constraints, national interests and the like. Such both/and theorizing is appealing as it captures the reality of a complex social world where it really is a 'bit of this and a bit of that factor' that combine to explain an outcome. At the same time, it is difficult -in a more social science sense -to parse out the exact role played by framing in the Congolese case. If we cannot determine its precise influence here, how can we apply it elsewhere?
Despite this concern, in the book's concluding chapter, Autesserre claims the "scope of this argument is not limited to the international intervention in the Congo. The approach … is valuable to understanding peacebuilding success or failure in many unstable environments around the world" (Autesserre 2010, 247) . The following pages provide a number of empirical examples broadly suggestive of the generalizability of her approach.
However, it is difficult to see the analytic role -if any -played by framing and the peacebuilding culture in these illustrations.
Second, given her process-tracing and mechanisms focus, Autesserre must address equifinality, which means considering the alternative causal pathways through which the outcome of interest might have occurred. However, it is not sufficient simply to consider alternative explanations for the observed outcome -failed interventions, in this casewhich Autesserre nicely does (Autesserre 2010, 14-23) . Rather, one needs to theorize the mechanisms suggested by alternative accounts, note their observable implications, and conduct process tracing on them (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 30-31) . In Autesserre's case, this would have involved taking the most plausible alternative, such as arguments based on national interests, and demonstrating that, at key points in the process, they generated observable implications different from what she found.
Third, Autesserre fails to offer a broader, integrative framework that combines different theoretical schools, which is a missed opportunity. After all, this is a book with a firm grounding in constructivist ontology (culture and frames creating meaning, making action possible) but one that simultaneously recognizes the importance of rationalist factors (material constraints, strategic action). That is, the building blocks for such a framework are there. Moreover, it is precisely a focus on mechanisms and process -as seen in
Autesserre -that makes it easier to identify points of contact between different theories (Checkel 2013a) .
IV. Mechanisms and Process Tracing Are Not Enough
For students of international organizations, the move to process and mechanisms and to the method of process tracing has been salutary. As the books reviewed attest, the result has been rich and analytically rigorous studies that demonstrate the multiple roles institutions play in global politics. We now know much more about how these organizations really work and shape the behavior and interests of states. The embrace of a mechanism-based understanding of causality and application of process tracing have reduced reliance on 'as if' assumptions and thus heightened theoretical-empirical concern with capturing better the complex social reality of IOs.
Yet, as my criticisms suggest, there is no such thing as a free lunch, even in the study of 
Method
Given the centrality of causal mechanisms in the books reviewed, I focus here on a key method for measuring them -process tracing. All the authors do a good job at this level;
this is all the more notable because they were mostly writing well before the recent literature seeking to systematize and establish good standards for it (Collier 2011; Beach and Pedersen 2013, for example).
Nonetheless, future work on process tracing and measuring the causal mechanisms of the IO-state relation could improve on three counts. First, process tracers need carefully and fully to theorize their mechanisms. The more care at this stage, the clearer will be those mechanisms' observable implications. Put differently, "[t]heory must take primacy over method. Theory offers the perspective through which we can interpret empirical observation … [T]he interpretation of events in a process-tracing case study is shaped by theory" (Gates 2008, 27) . Of the four books reviewed above, Schimmelfennig (2003) goes the furthest in this direction; it is no coincidence, then, that his process tracing is the most transparent and systematic in application.
This strategy of theoretical specification was also pursued by Checkel and collaborators in their work on European institutions and socialization. They took the mechanism of socialization, disaggregated it into three sub-mechanisms (strategic calculation, role playing, normative suasion), theorized scope conditions for each, and specified their differing observable implications (Checkel 2007, ch.1) . This allowed them not only to avoid "lazy mechanism-based storytelling" (Hedstroem and Ylikoski 2010, 64) , but to advance the process-based research program on IOs and socialization.
Second, scholars studying IOs from a mechanism based perspective must address fully the challenges raised by equifinality, where multiple causal pathways may lead to the same outcome. It is not sufficient to carry out process-tracing on one's preferred mechanism, or to run through a list of alternative explanations. A far better procedure is to outline the process tracing predictions of a wide range of alternative explanations of a case in advance, and then to consider the actual evidence for and against each explanation (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 30-31) . Done properly, this takes time (and resources) and should thus be integrated into research designs at an early stage.
Moreover -and to link back to my first point -full, robust theorization of these various mechanisms will only facilitate this task. The point is not to eliminate equifinality; that is not possible given the complex social world we (and IOs) inhabit. Rather, by explicitly addressing it, the researcher increases readers' confidence in the validity of the mechanism-process story he/she relates.
Third, process tracing should not be viewed as the only way of capturing causal mechanisms. One promising strategy is to employ computer techniques known as agent- 
Theory
Despite or because of the focus on mechanisms and process tracing over the past decade, one recent agenda-setting essay on IOs concluded that "more attention to the causal mechanisms advanced … would greatly enhance our ability to explain the world around us" (Martin and Simmons 2013, 344) . Given the results achieved to date, such an endorsement makes sense -and is consistent with the move to mechanism-based theorizing in political science and other disciplines more generally (Johnson 2006; Gerring 2007; Hedstroem and Ylikoski 2010 ).
Yet in almost all cases -and this is my first theoretical concern -there is a trade-off.
Mechanisms and process tracing provide nuance and fine-grained detail, filling-in the allimportant steps between independent and dependent variables, but do so at the expense of Unfortunately, it is not clear. Mind you, we have a name for the replacement -middlerange theory -which is repeated with mantra-like frequency by a growing number of graduate students and scholars. Missing, however, is an operational sense for how such theory is constructed and critical self-reflection on its limitations. For sure, the very name tells us something: Middle-range theory is in-between grand, parsimonious theories and complex, descriptive narratives. Typically, it brings together several independent variables and causal mechanisms to explain an outcome, leading some to term it typological theory (George and Bennett 2005) . The ideal is that the resulting framework will have some degree of generalizability -in a particular region or during a particular period of time, say (George 1993; see also Checkel 2007) . More recently, prominent scholars have endorsed such theorizing as the way forward for the IR subfield as a whole (Katzenstein and Sil 2010) .
However, middle-range theory has three potential drawbacks about which students of IOs should be aware. For one, it will often be over-determined. That is, with several independent variables or mechanisms in play, it is not possible to isolate the causal impact of any single factor. One way to address and minimize this problem is by emphasizing research design at early stages of a project, carefully choosing cases for process tracing that allow the isolation of particular theorized mechanisms. This may sound like Grad Seminar 101 advice, but it needs nonetheless to be stressed (see also Martin and Simmons 2013, 344; George and Bennett 2005; Seawright and Gerring 2008) .
In addition, when large parts of a research program are characterized by mid-range approaches, the production of cumulative theoretical knowledge may be hindered.
Specifically, for work on IOs and institutions, the various middle-range efforts -including those surveyed above -are not coalescing into a broader theoretical whole. Instead, we have proliferating lists of variables and causal mechanisms. Contrast this with neo-liberal institutionalism -a paradigm-based, non-plural body of theory on the same topic (Keohane 1984) . Here, there has been theoretical advance and cumulation, as later efforts build upon earlier work -for example, by adding process and domestic politics variables while still keeping a rational-choice core (Mitchell 1994; Simmons 1994; Wallander 1999; Martin 2000, for example) . Of course, some would argue that the neo-liberals' advances are mitigated and indeed perhaps made possible by empirics that are still too often illustrative or not systematically tested against alternative explanations.
Yet, this need not be a zero-sum game, where mechanisms and rich empirics automatically lead to less robust theory. Instead, students of IOs with a process focus need to more consistently place their explanations within families of theories on mechanisms -agent to structure, structure to agent, agent to agent, structure to structure mechanisms, for example. They should also explore whether their mechanisms relate to power, institutional efficiency, or legitimacy. Thinking along these lines, together with more careful attention to scope conditions and typological interactions among variables, can promote more cumulative theorizing (see also Bennett, 2013a, b) .
Finally, there is a tendency with middle-range approaches to adopt a micro-focus, where one theorizes (interacting) causal mechanisms in some temporally or spatially delimited frame (Haas 2010, 11) . The danger is then to miss the macro-level, where material power and social discourses -say -fundamentally shape and predetermine the mechanisms playing out at lower levels. This is precisely the trap into which Checkel and collaborators fell in their project developing theoretically plural, process-based, middle-range theories of European IOs and socialization. A global search of the resulting volume reveals virtually no hits for either power or discourse (Checkel 2007, passim) . More generally and as Nau has argued, middle-range theories "inevitably leave out 'big questions' posed from different or higher levels of analysis"; they may thus "not get rid of 'isms' [but] just hide them and make it harder to challenge prevailing ones" (Nau 2011, 489-90) .
To be clear, the middle-range theory currently favored by many students of IOs is caused not by process tracing, but by the prior, analytic choice in favor of mechanisms. Yet, process tracing does play a supporting role, especially when it is used without sufficient prior attention to design, theory and operationalization. And the latter is all the more likely given that many process tracers are problem driven scholars who want -simply and admirably -'to get on with it,' explaining better the world around us.
One promising possibility for addressing these analytic problems is typological theory, or theories about how combinations of mechanisms interact in shaping outcomes for specified populations. Compared to middle-range approaches, this form of theorizing has several advantages. It provides a way to address interactions effects and other forms of complexity; stimulates fruitful iteration between cases, the specification of populations, and theories; and creates a framework for cumulative progress. On the latter, subsequent researchers can add or change variables and re-code or add cases while still building on earlier attempts at typological theorizing on the phenomenon (George and Bennett 2005, ch.11) . For example, in a recent project on civil war (Checkel 2013b) , it was demonstrated that typological theorizing is one way to promote cumulation, even in the hard case of mid-range, theoretically plural accounts (Bennett 2013a Risse and collaborators sought to develop a model explaining the process through which international institutions and norms have effects at the national level; it was conceived from the beginning as a pluralist effort integrating causal mechanisms from both rational choice and social constructivism. To accomplish this integration, they employed a temporal-sequencing bridge building strategy. That is, it was the combination of different theoretical approaches -first, rational choice; then, constructivism -working at different times, that explained the outcome.
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Using this theoretically plural frame, the two books employ process tracing to demonstrate that compliance with international prescriptions is not just about learning new appropriate behavior, as many constructivists might argue. Nor, however, is it all about calculating international or domestic costs. Rather, by combining these mechanisms, Risse and collaborators provide scholars with a richer picture of the multiple causal pathways through which norms matter. If earlier, the implicit assumption was that these various pathways were complementary and reinforcing, the authors now recognize they may also work at cross purposes, with some strengthening domestic norm implementation while others may hinder it (Risse, Ropp, Sikkink 2013, ch.6 ).
All this said, it is important to note an important limitation in the authors' selfconsciously plural theory. If we continue with the bridge-building metaphor, then it is about a bridge not crossed -that of epistemology. Positivism or its close relation scientific 5 The latter is a thoroughly revised version of the 1999 book. My concerns about bridge building apply equally to both volumes. 6 In the more recent book, the authors maintain this commitment to theoretical pluralism and bridge building, while endorsing no one strategy, such as temporal sequencing. Riise, Ropp, Sikkink 2013, 12-13, ch.6) .
realism is the philosophical starting point for both volumes -exactly as we saw for the Schimmelfennig (2003) and Kelley (2004a) books discussed above. It would thus appear that theoretically plural accounts of IIs and IOs built on mechanisms and process tracing can include the whole spectrum of rationalist scholarship, but only that part of constructivism with a foundation in positivism. This seems unduly limiting as constructivism is a rich theoretical tradition with equally strong roots in interpretative social science (Adler 2013 ).
One possibility is that interpretive constructivism is missing from these accounts because it is structural and holistic, while the IO work reviewed here is about mechanisms and processes. However, this is not correct. Over the past decade, interpretive constructivists have added a strong element of process to their accounts (Neumann 2002) . They have done this through the concept of social practice, where "it is not only who we are that drives what we do; it is also what we do that determines who we are" (Pouliot 2010, 5-6 ). This has not been an abstract exercise, as the concept has been operationalized and rigorously applied -including to the study of IOs (Pouliot 2010, passim) . Moreover, scholars are now actively developing an interpretive variant of process tracing, thinking in concrete terms about how to do it well (Guzzini 2011; and Guzzini 2012, ch.11 ).
So, the concepts and tools are there to allow for a bolder form of theoretical bridge building -one that crosses epistemological boundaries -when studying IOs. However, it has for the most part not happened. Perhaps to combine (positivist) rationalism with (interpretive forms of) constructivism just cannot be done; it is an apples and oranges problem. The former is about cause, linearity, and fixed meanings, while the latter is about recursivity, fluidity, and the reconstruction of meaning. Yet, these black and white distinctions blur into 'bridgeable' grays when the research is applied and empirical. Thus, in two important books, Hopf combines the interpretive recovery of meaning with causal, process-tracing case studies (Hopf 2002; Hopf 2012) . These books are about Soviet/Russian foreign policy and the origins of the Cold War; however, the basic interpretive-positivist bridge-building design could just as easily be applied to the study of IOs (Holzscheiter 2010, for example).
My point here is straightforward. Research on IOs has gained considerably by focusing on mechanisms and process over the past 15 years. It has also gained by integrating insights from both rational choice and constructivism. It may gain even more if it integrates practice and discourse -and interpretive forms of process tracing -into its accounts. And by gain, I simply mean it may acquire even more practical knowledge about why IOs do what they do in global politics (see also Checkel 2013a, 235-36) .
A final theoretical issue concerns domestic politics. Kelley (2004a) shows the clear benefit of beginning to incorporate the domestic level into explanations of IO effects on states.
More recently, Simmons (2009) , while again having no theory of domestic politics, goes a step further -systematically linking the nature of domestic legal systems (common versus civil law) to state receptivity to IO norms and rules.
Beyond the theoretical rationale of offering more complete and thus determinate explanations, there is a real world reason for bring domestic process into our theories about IOs. Simply put, for many IOs, what they decide and do have become the subject of deep and intense domestic (and transnational) political contestation and mobilization.
Consider the most powerful IO in the world -the European Union (EU). After decades when theorists of the EU ignored domestic process, national politics and politization now occupy an increasingly central place in their arguments (Hooghe and Marks 2009; and, especially, Risse 2014 ).
If scholars of IOs make this move to the domestic realm, they could benefit by learning from those comparativists who have already thought about mechanisms and process tracing at the national level. Indeed, while the challenges of doing good process tracing are no different, the complexity of (most) domestic-political processes -compared to their system-level counterparts -enhances the importance of a clearly operationalized and transparent use of process tracing (Wood 2003 , for a superb example).
At the same time, care should be exercised in not taking domestic politics and process too seriously, where system-level influences from IOs (and other actors) are ignored. This is 
